Pak-China Relations in the Cold War Era: A Theoretical Perspective
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Abstract: The intention of this theoretical research paper is not to test certain international relations theories and concepts, but to use them as tools to improve the interpretation search, and make the analytical (empirical) part more clear and context defined. A discourse in international relations in connection with the inter-state relations refers mostly to crisis or negative bilateral relationships. Since in this case, the objective is to analyze the strong bilateral relations by the neighboring states of China and Pakistan during the period of the Cold War, with an emphasis on their search for mutual security through different means. The main aim of using theories and concepts is to provide a base for research. In other words, a theory is a guide which directs a path for investigation. Keeping in mind this explanation, the study under research uses some paradigms and frameworks which help the main theory, to make clear the objectives of the article. The main theory for the paper which has been used is “neorealism or structural realism”.

Keywords: Neorealism, Balance of Power, Security, Pakistan, China, United States

I. Introduction
Neorealism has been focused in the paper by Kenneth N. Waltz and other neorealists’ arguments, by explaining and analyzing different concepts of the theory. It is important for the reason that Kenneth N. Waltz’s insistence on the systemic approach of the international system will improve the illustrative power of the important shifts and durability in the Sino-Pakistan relationship – prior to the start of 1960s and thereafter. Since the neorealism tradition emphasizes state-to-state relations in a form where the system of the international politics influences their contacts; in the shape of alliance formation, balance of power, balance of threat, security dilemma and common interest, to secure their principal aim of security. The Sino-Indian border war, US changed policy to Pakistan, China’s anti-double policy to both super powers, Indo-Soviet cooperation, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and thereafter; continuing changing geopolitical situations influenced China and Pakistan to strengthen their mutual security. Nevertheless, the incorporation of the “geopolitics”, surely, stabilizes the theoretical contribution of neorealism into the bilateral Pak-China relations and in end makes the theoretical tool to this research complete.

Following figure outlines the course of Sino-Pakistan relations in the Cold War era.

II. Neorealism / Structural Realism
The neorealism/structural realism is a distinct theory and an academic tradition of writing in the field of international relations. Kenneth N. Waltz, a renowned figure in scholarly circle formulated this theory by writing his book, “Theory of International Politics” in 1979.

“Structural realism presents a systemic portrait of international politics depicting component units according to the manner of their arrangement. For the purpose of developing a theory, states are cast as unitary actors wanting at least to survive, and are taken to be the system’s constituent units. The essential structural quality of the system is anarchy - the absence of a central monopoly of legitimate force”.¹
There was a need for a new paradigm to analyze the complex relations of states and put the world politics on a new way. “Waltz attempted to reformulate realism in a new and distinctive way. His aim was to cure the defects with earlier theories of international relations, including classical realism, by applying more scientific approach”.

Further, according to Joseph S. Nye Jr. “Waltz provides a more elegant theoretical basis for realism. He avoids references to humans pursuing power as an end; pursuit of power as a means is sufficient for his theory. Balance-of-power behavior by states is predicted by the structure of the international system. A system is a set of interacting units having behavioral regularities and identity over time. Its structure defines the ordering of its parts. Structure involves an ordering principle, specification of the functions of different parts, and the distribution of capabilities. In international politics, the ordering principle is anarchy, interpreted as the absence of a higher government above states. The specification of differentiation drops out because states perform similar functions. Thus the distribution of capabilities (multipolarity, bipolarity) predicts variations in states’ balance-of-power behavior. Waltz provides not merely a systemic theory to predict the behavior of the units (states), but a parsimonious structural systemic theory”.

Since then, a new beginning started for the framework of states’ relations on the world’s political stage. A profound scholarship has been produced by researchers, while using the concept of structural realism. The main emphasis here is on system of the international politics and its deriving results. According to Paul Schroeder “the central argument is that the broad outcomes of international politics derive more from the structural constraints of the states system than from unit behavior.” According to this perspective, the relations among states are influenced by the system, in which they interact to each other. This definition is against of classical realism, where the level of analysis is “state” by itself. Although, both classical realists and structural realists recognize the central role of the states in international system and consider “state” as a unitary element; but the neorealists are different from the classical realists in a view, where they concentrate on the international system. Thus a necessary question comes to mind: Why state is an important factor and what is most essential for a state? This has answered by Robert O. Keohane, by stating the state-regime relationship, stressing “sovereignty remains a constitutive principle and state authorities play a crucial role”.

State is responsible for its sovereignty to survive in a hostile and competitive environment. Sovereignty and state are complementary to one another. To achieve its sovereignty, a state determines its strategies in relevance with other states’ policies. “It is generally true, though not at all uniformly so, that states in the modern era, regardless of their ideology, domestic structure, individual aims, etc., have claimed exclusive sovereignty over their territory and the sole right to the legitimate use of force within it, have set a high value on their independence and security, have upheld their right to use force in self-defense, have tried to provide means for their defense, and have conducted foreign policy with an eye to maintaining their security and independence.”

This phenomenon of states’ struggle to protect its sovereignty is because of the system of international politics. Their competition with each other is due to the situation of no guardian around them. A self-seeking and self-guarding behavior of states is constrained by the complicated situation of “no-surety, no-guarantee”. This peculiar condition is motivated by anarchy, not hierarchy, as the system is anarchical. All along with anarchy, according to neorealism, worsening of states’ relations, conflicts, antagonism and wars are the products of international interaction among states. Keith L. Shimko has analyzed the statement in these words, “Neorealism, which is more appropriately labeled structural or systemic realism, seeks to explain international conflict and war in terms of the imperatives imposed on states by an inherently insecure, anarchical environment. It is the dynamics of the system which compel states to behave in certain ways if they wish to survive, and survival is assumed to be the minimum objective of all states. States seek to maintain or expand their influence because they are forced to do so by the logic of the system, not because they are disposed to do so.” As a result, states and their incessant competition are seen as a defining element of global reality; all other dimensions of world politics become secondary. What matters in an anarchical environment is to get security through different means for survival. Although economic, cultural, ideological, and environmental security is necessary too, however, military and political security is of prime importance for states.

“The evolution of the ‘special relationship’ between Pakistan and the People’s China is best analyzed in a conceptual framework where ideological considerations are replaced by security interests and realpolitik as prime determinants of the relationship between states.” The Sino-Pakistan relations in the period of Cold War were strongly affected by the international system. Here the international system is restricted to the region of South Asia. Beside China and Pakistan; India, United States and the Soviet Union, were the states which potentially have influenced the Sino-Pakistan relations. The theory of structural realism is important in this regard, by the fact of its power that it correctly analyzes the Cold War competition and as a result, the changing shifts in the states’ policies.

The neorealists’ common concentration of the research may be summarized in the following sentence; the principal or most important factors are the states, that (in turn) are both unitary and rational, and the most important (regional or international) issue is national security. This systemic approach of the theory enables us to see the structure of the system, and variations in it, affecting the interacting units and the outcomes they produce. International structure emerges from the interaction of states and then constrains them from taking...
certain actions while propelling them toward others. Although it is clear that the Cold War competition was between the United States and the Soviet Union, but it also left impression on many states’ relations with them and other states. The Cold War legacy has had tremendous impact on global and regional security. In Jan Nijman’s words; “since World War II, the U.S. and the Soviet Union imposed a bipolar order that had worldwide repercussions”9 Regarding the article it is not wrong to characterize the Sino-Pakistan relationship during the period of the study to analyze their respective relations with the two super powers and India. With reference to the topic, US, USSR and India in the South Asian region adjusted their strategies with different goals. The United States and the Soviet Union were the levers of the international system; with their changed and adjusting policies, other states of South Asia and China were propelled to reconsider their foreign policies and intraregional relations. Thus the “Chinese foreign policy behavior, in the first instance, best be understood in terms of the constraints superimposed upon it by the structure of the international system”.10 In correlation to this, it may be interesting to ask; what role did the super powers (United States and Soviet Union) perform towards the South Asian regional setting, and then directly or indirectly influenced the Sino-Pakistan relations during the era under the research? From the structural perspective, among others, the Sino-Indian border war and United States cum Soviet Union help of India during war were most important factors, to be viewed as a base for Sino-Pakistan cordiality. The Indo-Pakistan hostility in the shape of unsettled issues gave a life-blood to Sino-Pakistan entente too. From the larger geographical perspective, national interests of the competing two super powers and regional states of China, Pakistan and India, with overlapping claims and objectives in the region, created a complex set of interactions.11 China and the Soviet Union were allies in the start of 1950s opposing strongly the U.S. policies, but the late fifties saw a worsening shift in Sino-Soviet relations. As the study suggests that, the U.S., USSR and India were also important factors for the Sino-Pakistan initiative to converge their views and interests. India pursued its policy of non-alignment and as a leader of the Third World nations in the heydays of the Cold War. But these Sino-Soviet differences compelled the USSR to be close with India. At the same time, the Sino- Indian Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai (Indian-Chinese are brothers) slogan calmed down. On other side of the complex political scenario, there were signs of suspicions and despair in the U.S.-Pakistan alliance, which was started in the mid fifties by signing their Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, SEATO and CENTO. The continuing shifts and readjustments of the mentioned states’ strategies gave rise to new dimensions of the South Asian politics and states’ relations. Why did the Sino-Soviet differences reach to an extent which later developed into mutual hostility, and what kind of impact it left over Sino-Pakistan relations? Why the Sino-Indian brothers’ era come to an end and by which way it make possible the Sino-Pakistan entente? More to ask, why American-Pakistan alliance worsened and how did it affect the Sino-Pakistan relations? The most important reason for the Sino-soviet rift was the concept of the communist movement’s leadership. “Both the Chinese and the Soviets have claimed for themselves the full authority conferred by the myth of the Communist party”.12 With the growing number of the newly third world countries and their zeal of getting liberation from colonial powers, brought China and Soviet Union to enmity. By the structural perspective, the newly established states changed the international system.13 A reason of the U.S. policies to both countries is not out of question as well. In addition, the Sino-Soviet leg-pulling of each other altered their priorities in the Subcontinent’s power politics. The Soviet’s attitude towards Pakistan was already not friendly, as Pakistan was an ally of the United States. In short, the Sino-Pakistan entente cordiale was a product of the Cold War international system. As long as the Cold War continued between the United States and the Soviet Union, it gave an upward move to the China and Pakistan bilateral ties. But when the international structure changed after the Soviet disintegration, it left impacts on the Sino-Pakistan relations, not very positively. “Rooted in the postwar structure of international politics, the Cold War for more than four decades stubbornly refused to evolve into a warm peace. The Cold War could not end until the structure that sustained it began to erode”.14 In connection with the above-mentioned international system, some important aspects of the structural realism are discussed below.

III. Security

According to some scholars “the concept of security is difficult to define and even more difficult to operationalize for a number of reasons”.15 But in simple words: “Security is the protection of a person, property or organization from an attack”.16 In an environment of states where there is no world government to check their actions in a proper way, there is always a danger of attack for a state from another state. States determine their strategies to protect their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Different types of protection for a state include prevention, response and pre-emptive attacks. The adoption of a specific protection measure depends on the situation and strength of a state. When a state is weak or in some cases not highly vulnerable to attack, it will implement the strategy of prevention. While a state (somewhat powerful) is attacked by another state or states, will response in a manner to neutralize the attack. These are sometimes also called the defensive nature. There is also a possibility of pre-emptive attack for a state. For two reasons a state will do attack: It will attack, when the situation for its invasion increase its own interests or when there is a sign of another state’s future attack.
Because of the self-help situation in international relations, both choices of preemptive attack for a state are open. Neorealism is security-oriented theory. This theory has analyzed the concept of “security” in relation to states’ relations with each other in an anarchic world. Kenneth N. Waltz commented, “Structural theory assumes that the dominant goal of states is security, since to pursue whatever other goals they may have, they first must survive. Bandwagoning and balancing by the logic of the theory opposite responses of security-seeking states to their situations. States concerned for their security value relative gains over absolute ones.” 17 Because of the distrust among the states, as neorealists emphasize, security is necessary for a state’s sovereignty. Paul Roe argues that “the main security issue at the interstate level is sovereignty.” 18 States safeguard their sovereignties in a number of ways. “Sovereignty is defended by the use of security resources – military might and political power”. 19 Looking to the present case study, sovereignty of China and Pakistan threatened by different ways. Both the states had faced a dilemma on various occasions. China’s seeking security and military strength was motivated by its past history when colonizers had invaded China and latter enhanced “by the regional wars following the 1949 revolution – the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the border clashes with India and the Soviet Union”. 20 China and Pakistan demarcated their mutual boundary on 2nd March 1963 because of the sovereignty problem. As China had fought war with India in October 1962, it was a golden opportunity for her to engage with Pakistan on its border issue. Pakistan was too willing to avoid the future’s complexities in this regard. Both the states claimed their respective authority on territories along their border by issuing different maps. Further, during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, Pakistan was directly a victim of Indian aggression. Its sovereignty was under a crucial situation. Not less was the Chinese case when China raised her voice on Indian intrusion in its soil. China and Pakistan used both the sources of security - military might and political power. Pakistan was engaged militarily face to face with India, and China issued ultimatums to India of the former’s mobilization of forces and grave consequences for India. China supplied military equipments to Pakistan and politically too condemned the action of India. Later in 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, China called India a “revisionist” and “aggressive” state. On Kashmir problem which is a life and death issue between India and Pakistan, China often supported Pakistan in the said period under study. On the other hand, unresolved Taiwan’s dilemma fundamentally posed a security threat to the People’s China. On the question of Taiwan issue, Pakistan had always supported “One China policy” and regarded Taiwan as an integral part of the mainland China. About the Pakistan’s foreign policy, it is “by and large has been conceived and pursued in terms of its relations with major powers such as the United States, China and the Soviet Union. Its dominant concern has been the threat which, in Pakistani eyes, India has posed to its security”. 21 The partition legacy of the united India left over some issues unresolved between India and Pakistan. For the sake of national security, Pakistan joined the Western bloc under the leadership of the United States. “Very weak states cannot make themselves secure by their own efforts”. 22 Although the Western alliances were against of communism but Pakistan’s interests were not to halt the Chinese way; rather to secure itself from the Indian domination. “The alignment with a superpower is a basic feature of security policy in a bipolar framework”. 23 The President Ayub’s pro-Western policy challenged from the inward direction. The then foreign Minister of Pakistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto stressed for the need to consolidate its relations with People’s China on firm grounds. Accordingly, “the choice of allies is also influenced by the internal political configurations of states apart from the general ideological preferences”. 24 The security concept becomes more complicated when a state want to increase its own security, though it doesn’t have any intention of aggression. Seeing the situation, another state will respond in a same way by securing its own security, which considers another state’s security measures as a threat. Robert Jervis outlined the statement in the words, “states often want more arms than their neighbors and wish to use tougher bargaining tactics in order to gain an upper hand in disputes”. 25 It is security dilemma which prevailed during the Cold War between the two superpowers and India, China, and Pakistan. United States and the Soviet Union stressed for their influence in the South Asian region and supplied political and military supports to their favorite states. “Given the country’s meager national wealth and the scope of the threat each of the superpowers posed, Beijing’s foreign policy for most of the four decades after 1949 was driven, in conformity with the principles of realpolitik, by a survivalist logic that frequently trumped other regime preferences”. 26 China tested its nuclear weapons in 1964 and India followed in 1974. Since Pakistan was vulnerable to Indian attack, indeed Pakistan started working on developing nuclear weapons. China has established strong military relations with the South Asian states especially Pakistan, as legitimate within the context of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. New Delhi has always viewed these relations as unacceptable threats to Indian security. 27 A nation-state’s security jeopardizes more when an aggressor is her neighbor. The China and Pakistan’s securities came under unavoidable condition when the USSR invaded a peaceful country, Afghanistan. “The change of regime in Afghanistan following the April 1978 revolution soon turned into a major strategic threat for both Pakistan and China. The Soviet invasion and continued presence of more than 85 thousand Soviet troops was considered by Pakistan to be an immediate threat to its vital interests and, by the PRC, to be a more remote but nonetheless serious threat”. 28 In the states’ calculations of a stable security, the following concepts play a vital role.
IV. Balance of Power and Alliance Politics

A. Balance of Power

Balance of power and alliance strategies are the prime components of the power politics. Since the ancient period, these tactics have been used by states to pursue their national interests and minimize the enemies’ influence. International relations experts (mostly realists/neorealists) use the term “balance of power” to make clear their view points. “In the classical literature of diplomatic history, the balance-of-power concept occupies a central position. Regardless of one’s interpretation of the term or one’s preference for or antipathy to it, the international relations scholar cannot escape dealing with it”.

In ancient Greece, the city-state of Athens challenged by another city-state of Sparta and her allies. Since the modern state-system in sixteenth century, balance of power and alliance politics have profoundly influenced international relations. “In the anarchy of the international system, the most reliable brake on the power of one state is the power of other states. The term balance of power refers to the general concept of one or more states’ power being used to balance that of another state or group of states”.

The neorealist tradition in IR has generally been used these concepts among the interaction of the nation-states. They consider them as vital that without balance of power and alliance politics, the anarchical nature of international relations cannot exist. When a growing power of a state or group of states is considered by another state or group of states as a threat and challenger to upset the international system, will often be checked. T.V. Paul has mentioned three important types of the balance of power.

1. Hard Balancing: It is a strategy of states when they are faced with crucial circumstances. In extreme situations, states use this kind of balance of power. They build and update their military capabilities in such a manner to offset the danger of rival states. The traditional realists and neorealists mainly restricted to hard balancing tactics.

2. Soft Balancing: It is a balancing policy of states which is not always an overt one. This kind of balancing lacks a formal alliance or treaty. It happens when states generally develop ententes or limited security-oriented understandings with each other to balance a potentially threatening state or a rising power. Soft balancing is often based on a limited arms buildup, short-living cooperative measures or collaborate in regional or international institutions. There is also possibility of an open and hard balancing strategy; when the potential state’s power grows unlimited and becomes a threat. Thus it can start a tough security competition between the states.

3. Asymmetric Balancing: It is a technique through which the nation-states try to balance and contain indirect threats posed by sub-national actors such as terrorist groups. These groups often do not have the capacity to challenge key states by using conventional military resources or strategies. On the other hand, asymmetric balancing can also be used by the sub-national actors and their state sponsors to challenge and weaken established states using asymmetric means such as terrorism.

In the underlying discussion, only the hard balancing and soft balancing strategies have been used. The asymmetric balancing will not be discussed. In connection with the Sino-Pakistan cordiality, balancing and counter-balancing policies continued throughout the period of under investigation. Pakistan’s relations with the United States, China’s ties with the Soviet Union in early era and India’s relations with the Soviet Union (against their respective rivals’ threats) represent hard balancing. While the Sino-Pakistan entente and Sino-U.S. détente represent Hard and soft balancing. Pakistan’s balancing was mainly against of India and then the Soviet Union. United States balancing was against the Soviet Union and China together, or against one state at different times. India’s balancing was against Pakistan and China. China’s balancing was against of United States, Soviet Union and India at a time, in sixties. Later was against of Soviet Union and to an extent, India. Soviet balancing was against of United States, sometimes China and to some extent, Pakistan. To make a clear-cut understanding of the Sino-Pakistan relations in the Cold War period and their search for mutual security, it is essential to throw light and critically analyze the balancing behavior of the United States, Soviet Union and India.

For the balance of power, two requirements are compulsory: The anarchic international system and the wishing of units (nation-states) to survive. The study under research fulfills both of the requirements. Of course, the international system was anarchic as the article uses the neorealist paradigm. Both the states had felt vulnerability regarding their sovereignties and national integrities, and struggled together to get their aim of mutual security. China and Pakistan have played the balancing game rather than bandwagoning to secure their respective sovereignties.

Balancing is alignment against the threatening power rather than the most powerful one; while bandwagoning is alignment with a dominant power, either to appease it or get some profit from it. Balancing and bandwagoning are opposite to one another. Sometimes states prefer balancing while in some cases; jump to bandwagoning, seeking their interests. Pakistan was much weaker than its rivals (India and Soviet Union) and had various internal problems. Yet Pakistan has made only minor concessions to its hostile states. Despite of Pakistan’s vulnerability to both states, it has not jumped to bandwagon with most threatening India and the Soviet. Pakistan chose to align itself with China because of no Chinese threatening attitude. Similar was the case with PRC in 1960s and thereafter, particularly in 1980s. Although the USSR was much powerful than the People’s China, still then China chose to balance the Soviet by alignment with the U.S. and Pakistan.
During the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965, the Soviet Union played a kind of balance of power role. “Moscow’s position was complicated by its desire to expand its ties with Pakistan, both to take advantage of Pakistan’s alienation from the United States and to limit Chinese influence in the country” 38 This balancing strategy among Pakistan, India, China and the Soviet Union continued thereafter. In the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971, there was again a balance of power on the war issue among them. Bhutto led a military delegation to China, and in return China assured Pakistan about possible help against the Indian aggression. Realizing the situation, India signed a “Friendship and Good Neighboring Relations Treaty” with the USSR. Later when the war broke out, PRC proposed a resolution, called for a cease-fire, withdrawal of forces and India as an aggressor. The Soviet Union responded by veto the resolution. After the war, for China “the first task ahead was then to restore at least a semblance of balance to the regional power structure. For that purpose, China took upon itself the rehabilitation of Pakistan’s armed forces, agreeing to replenish them without cost”.39 States feel fear more about threatening states especially when they are neighbors. This statement is best analyzed by the “balance of threat” theory. Stephen M. Walt argues that balance of threat theory is a more pure form of balance of power theory. Balance of power theory explains the states’ behavior that they will ally together to restructure the imbalance of power. While the balance of threat theory predicts that states will ally together against a threatening state or coalition of states. This theory works there where there is an imbalance of threat.40 Further he comments: “If balancing behavior is the norm, therefore, an increase in any of these factors-powers, proximity, offensive capabilities, or aggressive intentions-should encourage other states to ally against the most threatening power”.41 Keeping in mind the discussion, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late nineteen Eighties blew away the structure of regional international system. Soviet Union was a much powerful state than China and Pakistan. It possessed already offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions, revealed by its past history. Moreover, it was in close proximity to China and Pakistan. Naturally, the objective of alignment between China and Pakistan- with the help of the United States, was, to deter the Soviet Union and finally to repair the imbalance of threat which was caused by the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan.

B. Alliances
As like the balance of power tradition, the origin of alliance formation backs too, to ancient times. The alliance is the external face and an important component of balance of power. Like other tenets of the neorealism, alliances ensure the states’ survival as well. In the words of Michael W. Simon: “Security concerns influence the choice of alliance partners”.42 Usually those states will align together against threats that have common interests. Even it is possible for allies; commonly, when a great power and weak country are allies to have common convergent views on one hand and divergent views on the other. Pakistan’s alliance with the United States illustrates this behavior. When the U.S. and Pakistan signed their Mutual Assistance Agreement, SEATO and CENTO, they had common interest for their alliance to survive, to halt the spread of communism. The United States implemented the “Containment Policy”. The America had viewed its containment strategy from the global perspective, to block both of the Soviet and Chinese communism. Although Pakistan was feared of the Soviet Union due to the latter’s alignment with India, but was not vulnerable to Chinese communism. Pakistan and the United States had only one common interest; the Soviet Union. Pakistan formulated its alliance policy more regionally, to deter India. In 1950s, China too aligned herself with the Soviet Union against the United States. The United States, Soviet Union and India also have been discussed here because of the complex changing alliances’ patterns in South Asia, which have always left impressions on the Sino-Pakistan relations. “During the Cold War, the three major powers-the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)-were often torn by the desire to make alliances meaningful while at the same time behaving pragmatically to defend against would-be enemies. The result has been a series of often surprising alignments.43 An important point in this regard is that a state makes secure itself from her adversary by two ways. First, to increase its military and economic strength and second to make own alliance stronger and weaken the opposing one.44 In the Cold War period, not was Pakistan nor China in a position to make themselves secure by internal measures. Both moved to make alliances with their respective allies. But it should be clear that alliances are not life-lasting. According to Kenneth N. Waltz, “in a bipolar world, alliance leaders can design strategies primarily to advance their own interests and to cope with their main adversary and less to satisfy their own allies”.45 The U.S.-Pakistan alliance had faced this problem. The United States was concerned about the PRC and USSR in sixties and later only the USSR. But Pakistan’s main threat was India. The Sino-Soviet split occurred due to the Soviet détente with the United States in 1960s. Thus it can be said that alliances are not marriages of love but marriages of convenience. This bond of alliance can be made and break away very easily. Every state serves its own interests. When the states’ interests change, the alliance also becomes difficult to survive.46 Viewing the present case, the United States did not fulfill the Pakistan’s needs in a better way. It’s growing ties with India during the Kennedy Administration and later, its lack of full support to Pakistan in Indo-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971 refrained Pakistan from alliances with the United States. Same was the U.S. and U.S.S.R. help of India during the latter’s war with PRC in October 1962, which compelled China and Pakistan to look for their way of entente.
N Snyder has commented: “If a state feels highly dependent on its ally, directly or indirectly, if it perceives the ally as less dependent, if the alliance commitment is vague, and if the ally’s recent behavior suggests doubtful loyalty, the state will fear abandonment more than entrapment”. 47
A particular facet of alliance is alignment. Alignment is not a formal alliance for which a written treaty is needed but a temporary arrangement among states to stop a potential threat. Alignment is more strategic-oriented than alliance. At the same time, may be the allies have differences, but they align together against a threatening power. Such like alignment was among the U.S., China and Pakistan against the Soviet Union, during the latter’s invasion of Afghanistan and between the U.S. and India against China in 1962’s Sino-Indian war.
Although some scholars hold the view that China and Pakistan are allies but there has not been a formal treaty of alliance, only alignment between them. “China has long been loosely aligned with Pakistan in opposition to India (which was aligned with the Soviet Union)”. 58

C. Common Interest
Structural realism predicts that states will rally against a rising power or threatening state when the allies’ interests coincide with each other. States will also cooperate in other fields on the basis of the common interests. In the anarchic nature of the states’ international relations, common interests occupy a permanent position. Despite the different ideological, political, socio-economic and religious factors, states will establish and maintain good relations if their common interests do not overlap. It is also common that states of the same ideologies and political structures go to war with one another, when their interests strike. 49 The Sino-Pakistan cordial relations and the South Asian politics in the Cold War era represent the same behavior. The U.S.-Pakistan alliance suffered from setback in the early 1960s when their interests began to collide with each other. It was followed by the enduring Sino- Pakistan entente; despite the fact, that China and Pakistan belonged to two opposing ideologies. Pakistan is a Muslim state with capitalist system while China has no official religion with socialist system. The case of the Soviet Union was not different as well; The Soviet-Indian cordial relations reflect the element of “common interest” (as mentioned above in sections balance of power and alliances). There were cooperation among states in various fields, but the Cold War politics and particularly, the South Asian political stage shows “common interest” not positively.
According to Waltz “the common interest is ordinarily a negative one: fear of other states”. 50 Chinese leaders had disclosed to Bhutto in his visit to Peking that ‘common interest’ matters for friendly relations between China and Pakistan.51 The Sino-Pakistan cordiality indicates the claim of negative interest between them. Since India and Pakistan have long been strong adversaries, the Sino-Indian relations too have been fractured in the Cold War era. The main common interest between China and Pakistan, in the period under research, has been the Indian factor, “testing by adversary”.
Other common interests have been changed from time to time in the said period. For Pakistan, close linkages with China and United States were helpful for the reason to get strong its military and economics mainly against India on the one hand, and halt the Soviet’s way to India and the Indian Ocean, on the other hand. For China, close bond with Pakistan was beneficial for three reasons: To get alienate Pakistan from the U.S. and later, to establish a détente with U.S. through Pakistan; to reduce the Soviet influence in the region. Since India and Pakistan have long been strong adversaries, the Sino-Indian relation has not been a formal treaty or treaty-like relationship, the state will fear abandonment more than entrapment” (as mentioned above in sections balance of power and alliances). 47

China has been played a balance of power game between India and Pakistan by supporting the latter. Describing the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement, Vertzberger has commented: “Correct neighborly relations became closer from then on, developing into a relationship of allies bound together by common interests”. 53 China and Pakistan strengthened their relations through strategic engagement. China has supplied Pakistan a huge amount of military equipments in order to make Pakistan as strong as to oppose any aggression from another state. China was interested in Pakistan to make a route to Middle East, because of the Pakistan’s strategic position. It is necessary in strategic interest, to be sure that the ally’s powers resources are out of the adversary’s reach. 54
These were the common interests that the enduring Sino- Pakistan entente, during the period of underlying thesis had been continued. The internal and/or, external policies in both countries relatively gave an upward push to their relations.55 “In fact, the scope of mutual interests (between China and Pakistan) is so wide that even changes in leadership and regimes in both countries have not affected it”. 56 When the Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi visited India in late eighties, and the process of the USSR’s disintegration started, it affected Sino-Pakistan relations in somewhat negative direction. But, as mentioned already, the positive effects prevailed over the negative.

V. Geopolitics and Geo-strategy
The concepts of “geopolitics” and “geo-strategy” have been used in paper to supplement the main theory. It is important due to the reasons that the concepts are related to structural realism, because its emphasis on the relation between politics and geography. Also, in this case, the unique geo-strategic positions of Pakistan and
China enhance the value of the concepts. Goldstein has defined geopolitics as, “the use of geography as an element of power”. The geography remains constant which increases or decreases a state’s power. In more broad terms, the geopolitics can be analyzed as: “An important aspect of world politics is geopolitics. This includes the crucial aspect of “spatiality”– which emphasizes the location of things in relationship to other things, as well as how things are distributed. Every nation-state operates within a context shaped by many other states and other international actors”. A state’s geography is crucial for its power measurement. “Geopolitics is a pseudoscience erecting the factor of geography into an absolute that is supposed to determine the power, and hence the fate, of nations.”

The special characteristic of the Pakistan’s geographical set up needed security. In other words, the security considerations of the Pakistani policy makers, and to some extent, the Chinese policy makers were strongly influenced by their locations on the planet. Pakistan is surrounded by, beside the Arabian Sea; India, Afghanistan, China and Iran. The Soviet Union was also not far from Pakistan. State’s location strongly affects its interactions with other states. Neighbor states often go to war because of their geographical proximity. This statement comes true in the analysis of the present study. “Pakistan’s feelings of vulnerability caused by its peculiar geopolitical structure – its division into two areas more than 1,000 miles apart, its long border with Afghanistan in the west and its encircling by India in the east – and India’s advantage in size, population, and resources were a source of anxiety for Pakistan’s leaders”. As neighbors, India and Pakistan have fought wars with each other. The Pak-Afghan and the Pak-Soviet relations have also been mostly remaining strained. On the other hand, China had has major differences with its neighbors. China had border skirmishes with the Soviet Union and had fought battles with India and Vietnam, being its neighbors. While formulating its foreign policy, a state will bear in mind its own and other states’ geopolitical positions and considerations. This dilemma has shaped the approaches of China and Pakistan to be close with each other. Because, “a state should be most concerned with its immediate neighbors and less concerned with those far away.” The China and Pakistan’s hostile relations with India and the Soviet Union stepped up the Sino-Pakistan relations. Looking to the geopolitical situations, China wanted to have a foot-hold in Pakistan for the purpose to prevent Pakistan from going too close with the West. It also had the desire to use Pakistan as a bridge between itself and the Muslim countries of the Middle East. Most importantly, the uncertain future relations of China with India drew closer it toward Pakistan.

According to Brzezinski, active geostrategic players are states that have the ability to have influence beyond their own borders to the extent that affects the current world order. Although geostrategic players usually are powerful countries, all the powerful countries are not necessarily geostrategic players. Geopolitical pivots, on the other hand, are states that are not powerful themselves, but that are important because of their location or because of the consequences for the geostate players from the alteration of their positions. The geopolitical and geo-strategic conditions of a state or/and region, gives rise to multiple options for strengthening the security in anarchic world. The outside powers tend to have influence in different countries and regions by the tactics of geopolitics and geo-strategies. The United States and China’s coming closer together through Pakistan illustrates the importance of the above concepts. In the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971; the geopolitical considerations of the outside powers, paved way for them, to show their loyalty and credibility for their allies. China more radicalized its support for Pakistan and the Soviet Union too was ambitious for a greater role on behalf of India. M. Akram Rajput has remarked then, that the result of the geopolitical changes in South Asia was the emergence of the Soviet Union as an influential power in that region.” This change and latter the Soviet ambitions for more influence in the region, gave impetus for the ‘balance of power’ strategy among the United States, China and Pakistan to roll-back the Soviet’s geo-strategies. Related to the thesis, the new geo-strategies of China and Pakistan further cemented the Sino-Pakistan entente. In the wake of the Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan, Veltzberger remarked, “this relationship and Pakistan’s geostrategic importance commit China – both for moral reasons and to uphold its credibility – to a responsibility for Pakistan’s defense”.

VI. Conclusion

With supportive concepts of geopolitics and geo-strategy, neoralism/structural realism has been used in the paper. The main focus of the theory on ‘security’ in the presence of changing international system and anarchy can best suit the present case study. Although the domestic politics has a part in the formulation of a state’s foreign policy, the Sino-Pakistan cordiality in the Cold War era was more facilitated by the international system. Being doorstep neighbors, geopolitics and geo-strategy have also a big stake in the formation of Sino-Pakistan entente. The bi-polar system brought the superpowers’ competition to the South Asian region which made complications in the already hostile environment of relations between India and Pakistan on the one hand and; China and India on the other. To achieve their security for sovereignty, China and Pakistan were searching for friends and later aligned with the superpowers. The era under research was rich in power politics; in the shape of alliance formation, balance of power and balance of threat. To balance India and with variant degrees, the superpowers, China and Pakistan got aligned with each other. The common interest plays a vital role in
interactions of states with each other. This common interest was the backbone of Sino-Pakistan relations and their linkages with India, United States and the Soviet Union.

References

11. It represents the U.S. and Soviet Union ambitions of making more and more allies to strengthen their positions, Sino-Indian border disputes and struggle for regional dominance, and the Indo-Pakistan search for security and national sovereignty.
13. paras, various colonies got freedom from their colonial powers. They contributed to the international system in such a way that great powers were eager to have influence over them. China and Soviet Union had fear of these states that might join the capitalist bloc or remained non-aligned
30. The Athens was a great naval power while the Sparta relied mainly on its army for superiority. There was a “Treaty of Peace” between them. The Athenian Empire and the Spartan Alliance coexisted as along as a balance of power was maintained between them. When the Athenian power was growing, the Sparta viewed this as a threat. As a result, both the states went to a war in 431 BC, called as “Peloponnesian War”. It is a classical example of the balance of power and alliance politics.
33. Asymmetric balancing is relatively a new phenomenon if compare with other balancing strategies to Cold War politics. It is not important for this thesis due to the lack of its evidence in the Sino-Pakistan bilateral relations
34. It is necessary for the purpose that the US-USSR-India triangle is so deeply inter-connected with the Sino-Pakistan entente, that it can not be separated from the main topic of research.
41. Ibid.


Although the United States and China had been opponents in 1950s and later, but after the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972, they formed a quasi-alliance against the Soviet Union. And despite the same ideologies, politico-economic and one-party systems, the Soviet Union and China; and, Vietnam and China went to border clashes.


The China’s “Great Cultural Revolution” and the Deng Xiaoping’s coming into power affected China’s relations with some countries, but its relations with Pakistan was exceptional case. Similarly, many upheavals in Pakistan, for example, the separation of East Pakistan and changing of regimes didn’t leave a negative impact on its relations with China.


The former Soviet Union territory, now “Tajikistan” is separated from Pakistan by a narrow strip of Afghan corridor called, “Wakhan”. It is an artificial boundary created by the Treaty of St. Petersburg, a treaty between Russia and British India.


In 1986, Chris Crawford described in his book “International Politics as the Ultimate Global Game” that the balance of power is a game about geopolitics in the nuclear age.